

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

For Memo Chuko

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	PCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO	X			
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16	C/PPS/DO		X		
17	D/SOVA		X		
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

Executive Secretary
16 Aug 85

Date

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Executive Registry
85- 3199

15 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PPS/DO

FROM: DCI

SUBJECT: Counterpoint

This is good stuff. Send me a copy of Volume 1, Nos. 1, 2 and 3 without the holes punched in it. Also, Bob Gates and the people following disinformation somehow ought to get a subscription to it.



William J. Casey



COUNTERPOINT

A Periodic Newsletter On Soviet Active Measures

VOL. 1 NO. 2

MAY 1985

THE MARKETING of MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

As each new leader ascends to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU, the Soviet agitprop workers create an image for him and 'sell' it to the West. Because of the secrecy that surrounds the private and public lives of the Soviet leadership, the West eagerly consumes what little knowledge is made available. Ever hopeful that one day communism will assume a human face, the West time and again 'buys' the image and ignores the reality.

There was kindly Papa Lenin, forceful Uncle Joe, the folksy Khrushchev, the peace-loving Brezhnev and the westernized Andropov. Now we are given Mikhail Gorbachev — a man who is more like us, an intellectual reformer and a pragmatist with whom the West can deal effectively.


For Gorbachev, his press clippings note, is a lawyer and the best educated Soviet leader since Lenin. As Stalin liquidated anyone of his generation who was brighter than he was, this is not too surprising. Mr Gorbachev, although trained as a lawyer, never practised law but devoted himself to party work instead. As a Soviet lawyer's job is to see that the formalities of Soviet law are maintained, being a lawyer does not necessarily mean that Gorbachev is either a well-educated intellectual or a champion of justice.

Mr Gorbachev's reputation as a 'reformer' was earned by his efforts to improve Soviet agricultural performance. He served as the CPSU's Secretary for Agriculture, a no-win/no-lose position: no-win

because Soviet agriculture is hopelessly mismanaged by the Party and no-lose because it is impossible to do a worse job than your predecessor. In the Soviet Union reform takes place within the system and does not entail any change of the system itself. Gorbachev's 'reforms' were little more than tinkering with an already discredited system of management. There is no reason to believe that he contemplates any significant change in his country's economic or governmental structures.

There is also no reason to see Gorbachev as a reformer of foreign policy. Although as a specialist on agriculture he has not focused to any great extent on international relations, Gorbachev has supported the Party line on foreign affairs and has not given any indication that he disagrees with it in any way. He has praised the Vietnamese invasion of Laos and Kampuchea, attacked the West for its 'psychological warfare' against the Eastern Bloc, and defended the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. His few statements on foreign policy hardly support the image of Gorbachev as a young liberal intent on a less belligerent approach to the West.

Mr Gorbachev has been labelled a pragmatist, it seems, because he does not use Marxist-Leninist slogans in his conversations with Western leaders and reporters. No doubt, he will also refrain from using his shoe à la Khrushchev to make a political statement. But perhaps a far more



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APRIL 1985

SERVICE A of the FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE of the KGB

The term Active Measures is explained in the introductory letter to the first number of COUNTERPOINT. It is important to distinguish between the two distinct categories of such Soviet measures, i.e. between

- a) Overt Active Measures, and
- b) Covert Active Measures.

The responsibility for the planning and directing of *covert* Active Measures lies with Service A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. Service A closely cooperates with the International Department/International Information Department of the CPSU via the Secretariat of the Politburo, where all important measures are decided and where specific executive responsibility is allocated.

Service A directs and supports operations carried out overseas by the so-called PR Lines of the KGB Residencies overseas. Service A has been allocated more and more staff since the late 70s and early 80s and now constitutes a large section of the First Chief Directorate (FCD), employing some 200 officers and supporting staff, including keen young intellectual officers who see in this work a chance of rapid recognition and promotion. It is the one field where the Kremlin (the Instantsyia) can see real results.

The current head of the Service is Vladimir Petrovich Ivanov, a former KGB operator under TASS cover in Vienna. He has several area and functional Deputies. The Service now occupies more than half of the third floor of the FCD building at Yasenevo near Moscow.

Techniques regularly employed by the minions of Service A overseas include:

- covert manipulation of the media of foreign countries both capitalist and 'Socialist';

- the widespread use of so-called 'Agents of Influence' in all walks of the target country's life;

- the selective use of forged documents and of faked photo-montages and tapes;
- the systematic spreading of rumours and of material calculated to cause doubts and uncertainty;

- the systematic harassment of target individuals, institutions and organizations;

- the transmission of false intelligence through 'double agents' to other hostile intelligence services.

The larger part of the evidence of these activities has recently come from the Third World where Soviets find that they can "still get away with it". ▲



COUNTERPOINT

A Periodic Newsletter On Soviet Active Measures

VOL. 1 NO. 3

JUNE 1985

THE KGB's FESTIVAL

The World Youth Festival, scheduled to take place in late July in Moscow, is of great importance for the Soviet Politburo. Soviet specialists on Active Measures will make a major effort to manipulate the activities of hundreds of young people from the free world countries who will be present at the Festival for the dramatic enhancement of anti-US and anti-NATO propaganda in all continents.

From our many years of experience as members of Soviet intelligence organs, we can confidently predict what much of the planning of Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence (KGB) will entail.

Lists of the most active Soviet dissidents are compiled. During the Festival, all of them will be detained, either locked up in prison or under house arrest.

KGB technicians are thoroughly checking the audio bugs installed in all the hotel rooms where the foreign delegates will stay. Bugs are also installed at every table in restaurants which will be used to feed the foreign crowd. At this moment the KGB is working together with the Soviet Youth Organisations Committee (one of the International Department's fronts) to finalize plans and draw up charts as to where each delegation will stay. This is to allow the KGB time to install the most sophisticated bugging devices in the rooms of delegates from the USA, Great Britain, France, and certain other Western countries – regardless of whether the delegates are pro-Soviet or not. The

KGB does not trust its own citizens and never trusts foreigners.

The KGB is arranging seminars for the guides and interpreters, the majority of whom are witting or unwitting KGB informers, to coordinate their reporting to the KGB case officers on every foreign delegate. Young KGB officers are being assigned to each busload of delegates so that they will be able to react immediately to any unexpected situations.

The KGB's First Chief Directorate (the external intelligence service) has already sent top secret coded cables to every KGB residency abroad. The cable requires each residency to obtain, through agents in political circles and through semi-overt contacts, information on the political standpoint of the delegation to the Festival. If criticism is intended of the Soviet Union's external policy, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, or its domestic policy, such as the persecution of dissidents, the residency must make every effort to get the position revised in a way favourable to the Soviet cause. The residency has to submit its proposals regarding young academicians, politicians, and businessmen who are already KGB agents. These individuals should be included in the member lists of delegations, or be invited as guests of the Festival, to use their visit to the Moscow Festival as cover for special training in techniques of espionage.

The huge division of the KGB's First Chief Directorate that is responsible for